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Our main objective is to improve decision making in counterterrorism applications by 
implementing expected utility for prescriptive decision making and prospect theory for descriptive 
modeling. The areas that we aim to improve are behavioral modeling of adversaries with multi 
objectives in counterterrorism applications and incorporating risk attitudes of decision makers to 
risk matrices in assessing risk within an adversarial counterterrorism framework. Traditionally, 
counterterrorism applications have been approached on a single attribute basis. We utilize a multi-
attribute prospect theory approach to more realistically model the attacker’s behavior, while using 
expected utility theory to prescribe the appropriate actions to the defender. We evaluate our 
approach by considering an attacker with multiple objectives who wishes to smuggle radioactive 
material into the United States and a defender who has the option to implement a screening process 
to hinder the attacker.  Next, we consider the use of risk matrices (a method widely used for 
assessing risk given a consequence and a probability pairing of a potential threat) in an adversarial 
framework – modeling an attacker and defender risk matrix using utility theory and linking the 
matrices with the Luce model. A shortcoming with modeling the attacker and the defender risk 
matrix using utility theory is utility theory’s failure to account for the decision makers’ deviation 
  
from rational behavior as seen in experimental literature. We consider an adversarial risk matrix 
framework that models the attacker risk matrix using prospect theory to overcome this 
shortcoming, while using expected utility theory to prescribe actions to the defender. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Merrick and Parnell (2011) review attacker/defender models, concentrating on different methods 
to represent the adaptation of the attacker to the defender’s decisions. Traditional decision analysis 
approaches represent such adaptation by varying the probability of the attacker choosing between 
their attack options (von Winterfeldt and Sullivan 2006, Bakir 2008, Merrick and McLay 2010). 
Game theoretic approaches study the equilibrium of the attacker’s and defender’s optimal 
decisions (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003; Bier, 2005; Heal and Kunreuther, 2005; Banks and 
Anderson, 2006; Zhuang and Bier, 2007; Zhuang et al., 2007; Bier et al., 2007a, 2007b). Paté-
Cornell and Guikema (2002), Parnell, Smith, and Moxley (2010), and Rios Insua, Rios, and Banks 
(2009) developed hybrid approaches that explicitly model the defender’s decisions, the attacker’s 
decisions, and uncertainties using game theoretic concepts. The three types of research do share 
some commonalities, however. They assume that each decision is made by maximizing expected 
value or expected utility and they use a single attribute to measure the outcomes.  
 This dissertation is comprised of three chapters on a common theme of attacker/defender 
models. In the following, we introduce the context of each chapter before explaining our 
contribution.  
1.1   Overview of Chapter 2 
 
Decision making in counterterrorism applications has been studied primarily on a single attribute 
basis, with the financial damage inflicted on a defender being the primary focus of analysis. Many 
of the studies in counterterrorism applications have considered an attacker and a defender who are 
rational. Studies suggest that it is more realistic to consider an attacker with multiple objectives. 
Further, empirical research suggests that decision makers are not purely rational, as they exhibit 
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loss aversion and likelihood insensitivity, phenomena that are modeled using Prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
In Chapter 2, we consider an attacker with multiple objectives who wishes to maximize the 
damage inflicted on the defender by smuggling radioactive material into the United States and a 
defender who wishes to minimize the damage caused by the attacker. The three objectives that the 
attacker considers are economic damage in terms of financial cost, psychological damage in terms 
of fear, and organizational growth in terms of recruitment rates. The defender has the option of 
implementing a screening process to hinder the attacker. We use prospect theory to describe the 
attacker while using expected utility theory to prescribe actions to the defender. We evaluate the 
impact of varying reference point, loss aversion and likelihood insensitivity values for the attacker 
in regards to the defender’s screening choices to conduct a complete analysis of prioritization of 
attacks and trade-offs.  
 1.2   Overview of Chapter 3 
 
A risk matrix is a risk evaluation method that is widely used in engineering applications. Risk 
matrices enable the decision maker by providing a ranking framework that helps evaluate the 
probability and consequence pairing of each risk scenario. The ease of use and ability to make 
quick decisions render risk matrices an attractive tool for industry use.  Cox (2008a) states several 
shortcomings with the risk matrix approach, while concluding its discontinuation unlikely due to 
its widespread adoption. Ruan et al. (2015) improves risk matrices by integrating the risk attitudes 
of decision makers via utility theory.  
In chapter 3, we bridge the work of Ruan et al. (2015) and Cox (2008b) to provide an 
adversarial risk matrix framework. An adversarial risk matrix enables hierarchical decision making 
where the attacker and the defender is modeled using expected utility theory. We use the Luce 
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model to provide a link between the attacker and defender matrices. We incorporate loss aversion 
for both the attacker and defender using a utility function with a risk aversion parameter. The 
impacts of varying attacker/defender loss aversion values on risk prioritization is analyzed to 
provide a complete understanding of how adversarial risk matrices can be adopted in practice.  
1.3   Overview of Chapter 4 
 
In Chapter 4, we extend Chapter 3 but following the approach used in Chapter 2. We consider 
adversarial risk matrices where the attacker is described using prospect theory and the defender is 
prescribed actions using expected utility theory. Prospect theoretic modeling of the attacker 
provides a descriptive framework that is more consistent with empirical research. Similar to 
Chapter 3, we evaluate the impact of varying attacker/defender loss aversion values on risk 
prioritization to provide a complete understanding of how adversarial risk matrices with a prospect 
theoretic attacker and expected utility defender can be adopted in practice. 
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Chapter 2: Behavioral Modeling of Adversaries with Multiple Objectives in 
Counterterrorism 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
An effective counter-terrorism decision framework incorporates the defender’s decisions and the 
attacker’s adaptation to them (Brown and Cox 2011). Keeney (2007) proposes that we should 
consider multiple objectives in the analysis of counterterrorism decisions. This has led to research 
on terrorists’ objectives, using intelligence experts as proxies for the terrorist decision makers 
(Rosoff and John 2009), with studies considering general terrorists (John and Rosoff 2011, 2014), 
Al Qaeda (Keeney and von Winterfeldt 2010), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
(Seibert et al. 2016). However, there is a lack of research on incorporating multiple objectives into 
attacker/defender models.  
The aim of attacker/defender models is to provide prescriptive recommendations to the 
defender, making the common use of expected utility theory appropriate. Recent research has 
focused on descriptive modeling of the attacker’s decision (Nguyen et al. 2013, Yang et al. 2013, 
Kar et al. 2015, Merrick and Leclerc 2016) using descriptive decision theories like prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and Quantal Response Equilibria (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). 
Such approaches are called asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive (Raiffa 1982) and, thus far, 
have focused solely on the economic impact of terrorist events on a single attribute basis.  
  In this paper, we extend attacker/defender models to incorporate multiple objectives. 
However, rather than assuming full rationality of the attacker in making such complex trade-offs, 
we follow the approach in asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive research in modeling the 
multiple objectives of the attacker. Yang et al. (2013), Merrick and Leclerc (2016), and Kar et al. 
(2015) chose prospect theory as the descriptive paradigm to model the attacker’s decisions in a 
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single-attribute asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive analysis. We extend this work to multiple 
attributes using a multi-attribute version of prospect theory. The application of such descriptive 
decision theories in counter-terrorism is not without difficulty, as we cannot perform decision 
making experiments on terrorists and it is not clear that the observed behavior of other populations 
is directly transferrable to modeling terrorists. However, the results of our analysis make it clear 
that ignoring decision behaviors that are commonly observed in experiments on many different 
types of decision makers can lead to incorrect predictions of the attacker’s actions and incorrect 
prescriptive recommendations for the defender.  
In the next section, we review attacker/defender models and the role of descriptive decision 
theories in modeling attacker decisions. We review specific descriptive theories for multiple 
objective decisions in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we describe our example decision, extending the 
work in Merrick and McLay (2010) on screening for radioactive dispersal devices to three 
attributes. We demonstrate the impact of multi-attribute prospect theory and various parameter 
choices on the example decision in Section 2.5. We discuss the results in Section 2.6 and their 
implications for both practitioners and researchers, before drawing conclusions and discussing 
potential future research directions in Section 2.7. 
2.2   Bringing Descriptive Decision Theories to Attacker/Defender Models  
 
Merrick and Parnell (2011) review attacker/defender models, concentrating on different methods 
to represent the adaptation of the attacker to the defender’s decisions. Traditional decision analysis 
approaches represent such adaptation by varying the probability of the attacker choosing between 
their attack options (von Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan 2006, Bakir 2008, Merrick and McLay 2010). 
Game theoretic approaches study the equilibrium of the attacker’s and defender’s optimal 
decisions (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003; Bier, 2005; Heal and Kunreuther, 2005; Banks and 
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Anderson, 2006; Zhuang and Bier, 2007; Zhuang et al., 2007; Bier et al., 2007a, 2007b). Paté-
Cornell and Guikema (2002), Parnell, Smith, and Moxley (2010), and Rios Insua, Rios, and Banks 
(2009) developed hybrid approaches that explicitly model the defender’s decisions, the attacker’s 
decisions, and uncertainties using game theoretic concepts. The three types of research do share 
some commonalities, however. They assume that each decision is made by maximizing expected 
value or expected utility and they use a single attribute to measure the outcomes.  
Raiffa (1982) describes three types of game theory research. The first is symmetrically 
descriptive research where one aims to describe the behavior of all decision makers in a 
competitive situation, now known as behavioral game theory (Camerer 2003). The second is 
symmetrically prescriptive research where one aims to prescribe the normatively best actions of 
each decision maker. The third is asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive research where one aims 
to prescribe the action one decision maker should take, while describing the actions that competing 
decision makers will take. Expected-utility theory (EUT) (Ramsey 1931, Savage 1954) is the 
accepted model for prescriptive research. von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) use EUT to 
model human preferences over risk in their theory of games, an assumption carried forward in the 
concept of a Nash equilibrium (Nash 1950). This makes classical game theory symmetrically 
prescriptive. 
However, the descriptive validity of EUT has been questioned, and many experimental 
anomalies have been identified that EUT cannot satisfy. In an effort to explain these anomalies, a 
number of alternative models of preferences under risk have been developed. The descriptive 
research of prospect theory (PT) by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) is a generalization of EUT aimed at accommodating three commonly observed systematic 
deviations of human behavior from EUT: reference dependence, probabilistic insensitivity, and 
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rank dependence. PT replaces EUT's assumption of linearity in probabilities with a probability 
weighting function and replaces the utility function with a reference-dependent value function. 
Here the reference point is the outcome below which the decision maker considers the consequence 
a loss and prospect theory incorporates the phenomenon of loss aversion by weighting losses more 
heavily than gains. For monetary outcomes, the reference point is usually assumed to be the 
decision maker’s current state of wealth or zero change. However, it can vary for monetary and 
other outcomes depending on the decision context. Kadane and Larkey (1982a, 1982b) discuss 
asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive analysis in game theory and propose the use of an 
“empirically supported psychological theory making at least probabilistic predictions about the 
strategies people are likely to use” for descriptive analyses. There is a small but growing literature 
that seeks to address how descriptive preferences should impact game theory (Ritzberger 1996, 
Berejikian 2002a, 2002b, Colman 2003, Butler 2007, Metzger and Rieger 2009).  
A growing literature applies asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive methods in 
attacker/defender models (Nguyen et al. 2013, Shan and Zhuang 2013, Yang et al. 2013, Merrick 
and Leclerc 2016, Kar et al. 2015), but this work has not considered an attacker with multiple 
objectives. 
2.3   Descriptive Models of Multiple Attribute Decision Making 
 
There are examples of multi-attribute utility (MAU) models in counter-terrorism. Leung et al. 
(2004) use a multi-attribute model to help the defender identify critical bridges. Feng and Keller 
(2006) use a multi-attribute to help the defender determine the best way to distribute Potassium 
Iodide after a nuclear incident. Merrick and McLay (2010) consider a two-objective value function 
in examining whether the defender should screen cargo containers for nuclear material. They find 
that depending on the multi-attribute value function used, the optimal container screening decision 
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can change significantly from that obtained with a single cost objective. MAU functions are 
appropriate for the defender decision model as we are working in a prescriptive mode and these 
models are well developed. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) outlined the main theory and approaches 
for building MAU functions in a prescriptive setting (see Keeney 1992, Kirkwood 1997, Abbas 
and Matheson 2005, Abbas 2009, Abbas 2011, Abbas and Bell 2011, 2012, and Bond et al. 2008, 
2010 for more recent extensions). 
MAU models are referred to as compensatory, since an increase in one attribute can 
compensate for a reduction in another and vice versa. Are such representations appropriate for the 
attacker decision model that is behavioral in nature? Simon (1955) proposed that people look for 
alternatives that meet their aspiration level for their most important objective and then their 
aspiration level for their second most important objective, etc. until they reach a single alternative. 
Tversky (1972) proposed that people look at aspects of an alternative, essentially features that may 
include meeting an aspiration level on an alternative. They then pick an aspect and eliminate all 
alternatives without this aspect, before moving on to the next aspect. However, the order of 
consideration is random, so the probability that an alternative is chosen is equal to the proportion 
of times the alternative remained at the end of this process across all possible random orderings of 
the aspects. Gigerenzer et al. (1999) propose a take-the-best (TTB) heuristic, where the attributes 
are ordered from most to least valid. The formulations in Simon (1955), Tversky (1972), and 
Gigerenzer et al. (1999) are non-compensatory as they incorporate different types of lexicographic 
ordering. Einhorn (1970, 1971) and Tversky et al. (1988) find that decision makers often exhibit 
non-compensatory effects in their choice patterns. However, this research has not incorporated 
decision making under uncertainty, a critical emphasis for counter-terrorism decisions and is thus 
not yet applicable in our application.  
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Fishburn (1984) and Miyamoto and Wakker (1996) studied MAU under non-expected 
utility formulations. Zank (2001) and Bleichrodt and Miyamoto (2003) introduced multi-attribute 
prospect theory, but their formulation of loss aversion considered whether the overall multi-
attribute outcome was above or below a reference point, i.e. an overall reference point is elicited 
in value units. Bleichrodt et al. (2009) proposed a different form of multi-attribute prospect theory 
where each attribute has its own reference point, i.e. each attribute’s reference point is specified in 
the attribute’s units. Each of these behavioral proposals deviates from prescriptive models like 
MAU. The formulations in Fishburn (1984), Miyamoto and Wakker (1996), Zank (2001), 
Bleichrodt and Miyamoto (2003), and Bleichrodt et al. (2009) are compensatory, but include 
behavioral effects such as likelihood insensitivity, reference dependence, and loss aversion that 
are commonly observed in the literature on decision making under uncertainty. As these 
compensatory models explicitly represent the uncertainty inherent in counter-terrorism decisions, 
we will apply these formulations in the ensuing development. Specifically, we will use the 
formulation of Bleichrodt et al. (2009) as it can represent different reference points for each 
attribute. 
Let us represent an attacker with three objectives as 𝑋", 𝑋#, and 𝑋$. The outcomes under 
each objective are represented by 𝑥&,(, for the 𝑖-th attribute and the 𝑗-th outcome (𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛&), and 
the outcomes are ordered by preference (so 𝑥&,( ≥ 𝑥&,(0"). Outcome 𝑥&,( occurs with probability 𝑝&,( and attribute 𝑋& has 𝑚& outcomes that are gains. We can then write the prospect theoretic value 
of a multiple attribute prospect under Bleichrodt et al. (2009) as 
 𝑃𝑇 𝑋", 𝑋#, 𝑋$ = 𝑘" 𝜋"	0(𝑝",():;(<" 𝑈"(𝑥",() +	 𝜋"	– (𝑝",()𝑈"(𝑥",()@;(<:;0"   
+𝑘# 𝜋#	0 𝑝#,(:A(<" 𝑈# 𝑥#,( + 𝜋#	– (𝑝#,()𝑈#(𝑥#,()@A(<:A0"   
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+𝑘$ 𝜋$	0(𝑝$,():B(<" 𝑈$(𝑥$,() 𝜋$	– (𝑝$,()𝑈$(𝑥$,()@B(<:B0"   (1) 
with 
 𝜋C	0(𝑝&,() = 𝑊&0 𝑝&,", … , 𝑝&,( − 𝑊&0 𝑝&,", … , 𝑝&,(F" ,  (2) 
for 𝑖 = 1,2,3,	and 
 𝜋C	F(𝑝&,() = 𝑊&F 𝑝&,(, … , 𝑝&,IJ − 𝑊&F 𝑝&,(0", … , 𝑝&,IJ ,  (3) 
for 𝑖 = 1,2,3. 𝜋C	0  and 𝜋C	F 	are the decision weights for the 𝑖-th attribute’s gains and 
losses, and 𝑊&0	and 𝑊&F are the 𝑖-th attribute’s probability weighting functions for gains and 
losses. In practice, 𝑊&0	and 𝑊&F are often assumed to be the same and take an inverse-S shape 
that represents over-sensitivity to high and low probabilities (certainty and possibility effects) 
and under-sensitivity to probabilities near one half (likelihood insensitivity).  𝑈", 𝑈#, and 𝑈$ are 
strictly increasing utility functions that are continuous and scaled on [0,1] and 𝑘", 𝑘#, and 𝑘$ are 
weights that sum to one.  
 In this formulation, the terrorist’s loss aversion and probability weighting function are 
incorporated on an attribute basis. Attribute level implementation of loss aversion and 
probability weighting function can be useful in applications. Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) 
concluded that decision weighting is outcome dependent with people deviating from expected 
utility in outcomes having a strong emotional component. While attribute-specific loss aversion 
has not yet been tested empirically, we find it intuitive to utilize a model that can account for 
varying attribute-specific loss aversion values. 
2.4   Case Study: Container Screening for Radioactive Dispersal Devices 
 
Containers shipments are one method for terrorists to smuggle radioactive material into the United 
States. Analysis of the screening process must consider the attacker’s decisions, defender’s 
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decisions, and uncertainty about outcomes. Several studies have focused on improving the 
container screening process given the significant costs of purchasing the screening equipment, 
continuing operations at each port, and delays to cargo entering the US. Lewis et al. (2003) 
consider problems encountered at prominent container ports, using algorithms to reduce delays 
incurred during the screening of containers. Bakir (2008) considers defending the US-Mexico 
border, evaluating the choice between new advanced spectroscopic portals and existing Radiation 
Portal Monitors on the US side of the border. Merrick and McLay (2010) consider a two-objective 
value function in examining whether the defender should screen cargo containers for nuclear 
material. Merrick and Parnell (2011) consider prescriptive intelligent adversary risk analysis, an 
adaptive decision making process where the defender adjusts the defense strategy based on the 
attacker’s decisions.  
Merrick and Leclerc (2016) layout the framework for the attacker and defender decisions, 
costs, and uncertain events for an adversary considering a single objective, maximizing economic 
damage (cost) suffered by the defender. The defender’s decision is shown as a decision tree in 
Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1: The defender decision tree 
The defender must first decide whether to install and operate the screening equipment. There is 
then a probability that the attacker can obtain the nuclear material and construct a Radiation 
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Dispersal Device (RDD) (or dirty bomb), followed by the attacker’s choice between available 
attack options. The distribution on the attacker’s choice is dependent on the defender’s decision 
because the attacker can observe whether a screening operation is in place at a given port through 
surveillance. If the attacker chooses a dirty bomb attack, then there is a known probability that the 
device is found during screening and if not found then there is a probability of a successful or 
failed attack. 
The defender can solve this decision tree by first determining the attacker’s decision. 
Screening is an effective option if it is a deterrent, i.e. the attacker will choose an RDD attack if 
the defender is not screening, but will choose a CW attack if the defender is screening. If the 
attacker is going to choose an RDD attack whether the defender is screening or not, then clearly 
screening is not effective. Further, if the attacker will always choose a conventional weapons (CW) 
attack whether the defender is screening or not, then it is not worthwhile for the defender to screen. 
Therefore, the defender should choose to invest in screening if it will deter the attacker from an 
RDD attack, but should not choosing screening if it does not change the attacker’s decision. 
Merrick and Leclerc (2016) model the attacker’s decisions using single-attribute prospect 
theory. They consider only the cost of the attack to the defender, with the attacker seeking to 
maximize the cost and the defender seeking to minimize it. Keeney (2007) develop an initial set 
of objectives for a generic terrorist. Keeney and von Winterfeldt (2010) interview intelligence 
experts and review public statements to determine Al Qaeda’s objectives. Seibert et al. (2016) 
follow a similar process to analyze the objectives of both leaders and followers in ISIL.).  
The objectives from Keeney (2007), Keeney and von Winterfeldt (2010), and Seibert et al. 
(2015) fall into three themes: maximizing economic impact, instilling fear in the target population, 
and ensuring the longevity of the terrorist organization (represented here as maximizing 
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recruitment). We extend the work of Merrick and Leclerc (2016) to consider these three objectives. 
This is admittedly a small subset of the objectives determined for Al Qaeda and ISIL, but our 
objectives are generally representative of the type of objectives in the broader set and allow us to 
study the impact of the parameters of the behavioral multi-attribute model without becoming 
overly complex. The attacker seeks to achieve these objectives in their decision whether to attack 
using a RDD or a conventional weapons attack. 
The recruitment attribute is standardized and ranges from 0 to 1. The best outcome from 
the attacker’s perspective under recruitment is a successful attack, whether RDD or CW, as this 
will give positive publicity amongst the terrorist group’s followers and increase recruitment, so 
both outcomes are assigned a value of 1. The worst outcome for recruitment is the smuggled 
nuclear material being found during screening as this will cause negative publicity and could 
reduce recruitment; this outcome is given the value 0. An attacker getting into the country but 
failing to carry out a CW attack is assumed to be neutral in terms of recruitment; this outcome is 
given the value 0.5. The effect on recruitment from the attacker getting an RDD into the country 
but failing to carry out the attack, denoted by f, is assumed to be 0.25.  
The fear attribute is also standardized and ranges from 0 to 1. The worst outcome for 
instilling fear is a failed CW attack, which is given the value 0. The best outcome for instilling fear 
is again a successful RDD attack, which is given the value 1. The fear caused by a successful CW 
attack is assumed to be half that of an RDD attack. If the defender finds radioactive material during 
screening or an RDD attack is foiled after getting into the country, the publicity will still cause 
fear in the target population. This outcome is given the value t, which is assumed to be 0.2.  
Following Merrick and Leclerc (2016), the cost of an RDD attack, denoted r, is assumed 
to be $40 billion. The cost of a conventional weapon attack, w, is assumed to be $20 billion. The 
  15 
cost of screening, denoted s, is assumed to be $100 million. We linearly scale the cost attribute 
from 0 to 1 to match the other attribute so zero cost takes the value 0 and the maximum cost of 𝑟 + 𝑠 takes the value 1. The attacker’s decisions tree is shown in Figure 2.2 with the outcomes 
under these three objectives. 
The reference point for the attributes of cost, recruitment, and fear are assumed to be $15 
billion, 0.5, and 0, respectively. Hence, an attack yielding an economic cost of less than $15 billion 
is regarded as a loss by the attacker. An outcome that negatively affects recruitment, characterized 
by a recruitment value of less than 0.5, is regarded as a loss by the attacker. All attacks, failed and 
successful, are assumed to either instill fear or maintain fear at existing levels. However, as the 
attacker can reach a guaranteed minimum fear level of 0.2 by attempting an RDD attack, we 
assume that the attacker finds a fear value less than 0.2 to be a loss. We use a simple value function 
for each attribute to represent loss aversion, specifically  
𝑣&(𝑥&) = 	 𝑥& − 𝑟&, 𝑥& ≥ 𝑟&𝜆&(𝑥& − 𝑟&) 𝑥& < 𝑟& 
where 𝑥& is the i-th attribute, 𝑟& is its reference point, and 𝜆& represents the attacker’s loss aversion 
with respect to the attribute, for 𝑖 = 1,2,3. 
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Figure 2.2: The attacker decision tree 
Again, following Merrick and Leclerc (2016), the probability of the defender finding the 
radiological material during screening, denoted by p, is assumed to be 0.8. The probability of a 
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successful RDD attack once the material has been smuggled into the country, denoted by q, is 
assumed to be 0.5. The probability of a successful CW attack, denoted by z, is assumed to be 0.9. 
We implement the neo-additive probability weighting function as discussed by Chateauneuf et 
al. (2007), 
𝑤 𝑝 = 	 1 𝑝 = 1𝑘𝑝 + 12 1 − 𝑘 0 < 𝑝 < 10 𝑝 = 0
										 
where 0 < k < 1. When k =1, this function is a straight line (𝑤 𝑝 = 𝑝) and represents no 
probability weighting. When k <1, the function maintains the values 𝑤 0 = 0, 𝑤 1 = 1,  and 𝑤 ;A = ;A, but has a slope less than one for 0 < 𝑝 < 1 which represents likelihood insensitivity. 
This leads to a significant jump in probability weight from just below 1 to 1 (representing the 
certainty effect) and from 0 to just above 0 (representing the possibility effect). Baillon et al. (2014) 
consider values of k between 0.6 and 0.8 when evaluating likelihood insensitivity for the neo-
additive probability weighting function. Thus, we use 0.7 as our base value and vary k between 
0.6 and 0.8 to determine the sensitivity of the model to this parameter. Novemsky and Kahneman 
(2005) determined that values for loss aversion, here denoted by 𝜆&	(𝑖 = 1,2,3), range from 1 to 3 
in experiments with 2 being the mode of observations. Hence, we consider the values of 1, 2, and 
3 for each 𝜆&. 
 
2.5   Results 
 
2.5.1 Decisions for a Risk-Neutral Attacker Considering Only One Objective 
 
We evaluate the optimal decision for a risk-neutral attacker under each of the three objectives 
independently (see Figure 2.2) before considering the implications of trade-offs amongst 
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objectives. We assume that f, t, p, q, z > 0, and q	≤	z. We first consider the attacker’s decisions 
when the defender is screening.  
The expected cost for an RDD attack is 1 − p q r + s + 1 − p 1 − q s + ps =−pqr + qr + s = 1 − p qr + s. The expected cost for a CW attack is ;Arz + s.	Thus, a risk neutral 
attacker considering only cost will choose an RDD attack if 1 − p qr + s > ;Azr + s or 1 − 𝑝 𝑞 > ;A𝑧. As 𝑞 ≤ 𝑧, this simplifies to 1 − 𝑝 > ;A or 𝑝 < ;A. As 𝑝 is the probability of finding 
an RDD during screening, this condition should not hold for any reasonable screening technology, 
so a risk neutral attacker should choose CW based on cost alone.  
Considering only recruitment, CW stochastically dominates RDD if 𝑧 ≥ 1 − 𝑝 𝑞. As the 
probability of a CW attack (𝑧 = 0.9) is high and the probability of getting through screening and 
then carrying a successful RDD attack ( 1 − 𝑝 𝑞 = 0.2×0.5 = 0.1) is low, CW stochastically 
dominates RDD under recruitment for plausible parameter values.  
The trade-offs under fear are more complex. The expected value for fear under an RDD 
attack and a CW attack are (1 − 𝑝)𝑞 + (1 − 1 − 𝑝 𝑞)𝑡	and ;A𝑧 respectively. Therefore, the 
preferences of a risk-neutral attacker considering only fear are dependent on the specific parameter 
choices. At the base case values, RDD is preferred. (Note that RDD would stochastically dominate 
CW if 1 − 𝑝 𝑞 ≥ 𝑧, but as this is the opposite condition to that mentioned above, this is not 
plausible) 
We next consider the simpler case of the attacker’s decisions when the defender is not 
screening. The expected value for economic damage under an RDD attack is 𝑞𝑟 compared to "# 𝑧𝑟 
under a CW attack. Hence, the attacker prefers an RDD attack if 2𝑞 > 𝑧; this condition is satisfied 
at base case values. Considering only recruitment, CW again stochastically dominates RDD as 𝑓 < "# and q	≤	z at plausible parameter values. The expected value for fear under an RDD attack 
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is 𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑡 compared to "# 𝑧 under a CW attack, again leading to a more complex trade-off, 
but RDD is chosen at the base case parameter values. 
In summary, a risk-neutral attacker considering only cost will choose CW if the defender 
screens and RDD if not. So this attacker is deterred by screening. However, the risk neutral attacker 
considering only recruitment will choose CW regardless of whether the defender is screening or 
not, while the risk-neutral attacker considering fear will choose RDD regardless. These results 
show the differences between attacker’s who value outcomes differently. 
2.5.2   Multi-objective Decision Making for the Rational versus Prospect Theoretic 
Attacker 
 
Figure 2.3 shows strategy plots for varying attribute weights for the base case prospect-theoretic 
attacker and a rational (and risk-neutral) attacker. These plots show the full space of possible 
attribute weight combinations for the cost, recruitment, and fear attributes. Since the attribute 
weights must sum up to a 100%, a ternary plot is used to represent all of the possible attribute 
weight combinations for the three attributes (cost, recruitment, and fear) in two dimensional space.   
 The axes/edges of the ternary plot are labeled using arrows and the respective attribute 
names to display the direction in which the attributes increase in value. Since there are three 
attributes, there are seven types of attribute weight combinations.  All of the possible attribute 
weight combination types and their respective location on the strategy plots are as follows:   
• All weight placement on cost – top vertex 
• All weight placement on fear – lower left vertex 
• All weight placement on recruitment – lower right vertex 
Excluding the vertices: 
• Some weight placement on fear and cost– fear axis  
• Some weight placement on fear and recruitment– recruitment axis  
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• Some weight placement on cost and recruitment– cost axis  
Excluding the vertices and axes: 
• Some weight placement on each of the attributes – triangle’s interior 
An attribute weight combination that falls on one of the three vertices corresponds to all weight 
placement on one attribute, hence no weight placement on the remaining two attributes. An 
attribute weight combination that falls on an axis, but not the vertex, corresponds to weight 
placement on only two of the three attributes (the axis that the point is on and the clockwise axis), 
hence no weight placement on the remaining attribute (the counter-clockwise axis). For example, 
if a point falls on the recruitment axis at the 40%, an attribute weight combination of 40% 
recruitment, 60% fear and 0% cost exists.  
 The attribute weight combinations where each attribute receives a weight are on the 
triangle’s interior, where the triangle’s interior is defined as any part of the triangle that is not an 
edge or a vertex. Three lines that run through the point of interest and extend to each axis are 
required to determine the attribute weights for cost, fear, and recruitment, respectively: 
1) A line parallel to the recruitment axis that connects the point to the cost axis 
2) A line parallel to the cost axis that connects the point to the fear axis 
3) A line parallel to the fear axis that connects the point to the recruitment axis 
The white gridlines on the triangle’s interior provide the guidance required to determine the 
attribute weights for the points in the triangle’s interior. 
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Prospect-theoretic Attacker vs. Rational Attacker 
 
Prospect-theoretic Attacker 𝜆=2, k=0.7 Rational Attacker 𝜆=1, k=1 
  
 
Figure 2.3: Evaluation of Prospect-theoretic Attacker vs. Rational Attacker 
Three shaded regions are provided to display actions available to the attacker: (1) use an 
RDD attack regardless of whether the defender is screening (the black region), (2) use an RDD 
attack when the defender is not screening and a CW attack when the defender is screening (the 
dark brown region), and (3) use a CW attack regardless of whether the defender is screening (the 
light brown region). The three regions represent all possible actions for the attacker. Thus, moving 
from a black region to the dark brown region means the attacker has switched from choosing RDD 
to CW if the defender is screening, while the attacker’s decision remains the same if the defender 
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is not screening, namely RDD. Similarly, moving from the dark brown region to the light brown 
region means that the attacker has switched from choosing RDD to CW if the defender is not 
screening, while the attacker’s decision remains the same if the defender is screening, namely CW. 
Considering the defender’s decision, as discussed in Merrick and Leclerc (2016) if the 
attacker uses an RDD attack regardless of screening or the attacker uses a CW attack regardless of 
screening then the defender should not screen, as screening is not a deterrent. On the other hand, 
if the attacker uses an RDD attack when the defender is not screening and a CW attack when the 
defender is screening, then the attacker is deterred by screening and screening is the best alternative 
for the defender. Thus, screening is a deterrent in the dark brown region, but not in the black or 
light brown regions.  
 Figure 2.3 shows the strategy plot for a prospect theoretic attacker on the left and a rational 
attacker on the right. The attacker is considered rational when 𝜆& = 1 (𝑖 = 1,2,3) and 𝑘 = 1, i.e. 
no loss aversion or likelihood insensitivity. The base case values for the prospect-theoretic 
attacker’s loss aversion and likelihood sensitivity are 𝜆& = 2 for all attributes (𝑖 = 1,2,3) and 𝑘 =0.7, as discussed in Section 2.4. As we found for the risk-neutral attacker considering only one 
objective, when all the weight is on cost, the rational attacker is deterred by screening; when all 
the weight is on recruitment, the rational attacker chooses CW regardless of screening; when all 
the weight is on fear, the rational attacker chooses RDD regardless of screening. In fact, the rational 
attacker does not use an RDD attack when the defender is screening, except when all the weight 
is on fear. The region where a prospect-theoretic attacker uses an RDD attack regardless of 
screening is larger than for a rational attacker, but the attribute weight on fear must still be close 
to 1.  
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 Let us now consider the region where the attacker is deterred by screening. For the rational 
attacker, if no weight is applied to recruitment, the attacker will be deterred. If all the weight is on 
cost and we start to add weight to recruitment, then there is a region before screening stops being 
a deterrence and the attacker chooses CW regardless of screening. If all the weight is on fear and 
we start to add weight to recruitment, then there is a larger region before screening stops being a 
deterrence. Comparing this to the prospect theoretic attacker, if all the weight is on cost and we 
start to add weight to recruitment, then there is almost no region before screening stops being a 
deterrence and the attacker chooses CW regardless of screening. If all the weight is on fear and we 
start to add weight to recruitment, then there is a region before screening stops being a deterrence, 
but it is smaller than for the rational attacker. This relationship is complex, so in the following 
sections we analyze the effect of various parameters on the attacker’s decision. 
2.5.3   Sensitivity of the Prospect Theoretic Attacker to Changes in Probabilities 
 
We vary the value of the probability of a successful RDD attack once the device is in the country, 
denoted by q, for a prospect theoretic attacker (𝜆	 = 2, 𝑘 = 0.7) in Figure 2.4. As q increases, the 
regions corresponding with RDD attacks also increase. The attacker employs an RDD attack across 
more attribute weight combinations regardless of the screening status. The attacker does not use 
an RDD attack when the defender is screening with 𝑞 = 0.25. 
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Evaluation of Varying Probability of a Successful RDD Attack Values (𝜆=2, k=0.7) 
 
q=0.25 q=0.5 q=0.75 
   
 
Figure 2.4: Sensitivity of the Attacker’s Decisions to the Probability of Successful RDD 
Attack Values 
 
The deterrence region, the area when screening is worthwhile, gets larger as q increases, thus 
rendering screening useful across more attribute weight combinations. Thus, if the chance of 
success of an RDD attack that gets into the country is low, the attacker will only be deterred by 
screening if they put significant weight on fear. Alternatively, if the chance of success once in 
the country is high, the attacker will be deterred unless almost all the weight is on fear or most of 
the weight is on recruitment.  
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Evaluation of Varying Probability of Screening Success Values (𝜆=2, k=0.7) 
 
p=0.7 p=0.8 p=0.9 
   
 
Figure 2.5. Sensitivity of the Attacker’s Decisions to the Probability of Successful RDD 
Attack Values  
 
The evaluation of varying probability of screening success values, p, using the benchmark 
values of (λ=2, k=0.7) is provided in Figure 2.5.  As p increases, the area representing RDD attack 
regardless of screening decreases. The attacker is less likely to employ an RDD attack when the 
defender is screening with an increasing probability of screening success. At 𝑝 = 0.9, the attacker 
does not use an RDD attack when the defender is screening. The deterrent area increases as p 
increases, since the attacker becomes less likely to employ an RDD attack regardless of screening. 
The difference between the dark brown and light brown regions is the attacker’s decision when the 
defender is not screening, so the border between them is not affected by changes in 𝑝. 
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2.5.4   Sensitivity of the Prospect Theoretic Attacker’s Decisions to Overall Loss Aversion 
and Likelihood Insensitivity 
 
We vary the values of loss aversion and likelihood insensitivity while maintaining the benchmark 
values of other parameters in Figure 2.6. We consider the values of 1, 2, and 3 for loss aversion 
for all attributes (𝜆" = 𝜆# = 𝜆$), and the values of 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8 for likelihood insensitivity (k) 
for the neo-additive probability weighting function. As the attacker becomes more probabilistically 
sensitive, the attacker is less likely to use an RDD attack. Across all values of loss aversion, the 
attacker does not use an RDD attack when the defender is screening with 𝑘 = 0.8. This indicates 
that if the attacker was more sensitive to changes in probability then the attacker would not choose 
an RDD attack when the defender is screening present for any values of the attribute weights. They 
would also only choose the RDD attack when the defender is not screening if the weight on fear 
was significant. Since an RDD attack instills more fear than a CW attack, it is intuitive that the 
attacker would prefer an RDD attack when instilling fear is the main objective.  
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Evaluation of Varying Loss Aversion and Likelihood Insensitivity Values  𝑞 = 0.5  𝜆/𝑘 0.6 0.7 0.8 
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Figure 2.6: Sensitivity of the Attacker’s Decisions to Varying Levels of Loss Aversion and 
Likelihood Insensitivity  
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As the probabilistic insensitivity increases and the attacker’s decision weight increasingly 
deviates from actual probabilities, an RDD attack takes place across more attribute weight 
combinations. When all of the weight is placed on recruitment, the attacker chooses a CW attack 
in all scenarios. Since, the failure of an RDD attack is considered a loss under recruitment (failure 
including the RDD material being found in the screening or the RDD making it through screening 
but failing to execute), it makes sense that an attacker placing all the weight on recruitment would 
choose a CW attack. Furthermore, as the loss aversion of the attacker increases, while keeping 
likelihood insensitivity constant, the attacker chooses to employ a CW attack regardless of 
screening for more attribute weight combinations as a CW attack provides the attacker with a 
higher probability of avoiding loss at our benchmark reference points. 
2.5.5  Sensitivity of the Prospect Theoretic Attacker’s Decisions to Changes in Reference 
Points and Loss Aversion 
 
To further examine the effect of loss aversion, we vary the reference point and loss aversion values 
one attribute at a time while keeping the rest of the attribute values at the benchmark setting. Loss 
aversion is varied between 1 and 3 for each attribute. The reference points are varied on an attribute 
basis.  
The effects of the varying reference point and loss aversion values on cost are shown in 
Figure 2.7. We consider $5 billion, $15 billion, and $25 billion for the reference point. The 
attacker’s decision across the full space of attribute weight combinations when 𝜆 = 1 (irrespective 
of the reference point) is the same for each reference point level.  
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Evaluation of Cost  
 
Lambda/ 
Reference Point $5 Billion $15 Billion $25 Billion 
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Figure 2.7: The Effect of Varying Loss Aversion and Reference Point Values on Cost 
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Thus, an attacker without loss aversion perceives the varying reference points the same. The 
necessity of loss aversion to alter the attacker’s decision is justified given that CW attack yields 
half the damage of an RDD attack. A loss aversion value greater than 1 modifies the attacker’s 
decision. 
The attacker’s decision varies at different loss aversion values when the reference points 
for cost are $15 billion and $25 billion. As loss aversion increases for the reference points of $15 
billion and $25 billion, the deterrence and RDD attack regardless of screening areas decrease. An 
attacker with most of the weight on instilling fear chooses an RDD attack irrespective of screening. 
As loss aversion increases, the attacker must place more weight on fear to use an RDD attack when 
the defender is screening because of the amplified losses of an RDD attack and the higher 
probabilities of such losses (when compared to CW). This is shown by the black region decreasing 
in size as loss aversion increases.  
Similarly, the deterrence region gets smaller as loss aversion increases. When screening is 
not present, the attacker using an RDD attack has a 0.5 probability of getting $40 billion and a 0.5 
probability of getting $0. Same attacker has a 0.9 probability of getting $20 billion and 0.1 
probability of getting $0. As loss aversion increases, an RDD attack with an unfavorable outcome 
paired with a higher probability of loss results in significantly larger losses than a CW attack. Thus, 
an attacker chooses a CW attack regardless of screening for more attribute weight combinations 
as loss aversion increases. Lastly, the deterrence region increases as the reference point increases, 
keeping loss aversion constant. An attacker finds an RDD attack more attractive as the reference 
point increases, making the CW attack less worthwhile.  
The effects of the varying reference point and loss aversion values on recruitment are 
shown in Figure 2.8. We consider 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 for the varying reference points. When the 
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reference point for recruitment is 0.25, the recruitment outcomes are effectively in an all gains 
frame, with the exception of the RDD being found during screening. This one outcome does not 
have a significant effect, so, the attacker’s decision is the same across the varying loss aversion 
values. Further, the attacker’s decision across the full space of attribute weight combinations when 𝜆 = 1 (irrespective of the reference point) is the same as what we observe when the reference point 
= 0.25 (irrespective of 𝜆).	The loss generated by recruitment at varying reference points is too 
small to have an impact on the overall decision in the absence of loss aversion. 
The attacker’s decision is not the same at varying loss aversion values when the reference 
points for recruitment are 0.5 and 0.75. As loss aversion increases for these reference points, the 
areas representing deterrence and an RDD attack regardless of screening decrease. An attacker 
whose primary objective is to instill fear uses an RDD attack regardless of screening for less 
attribute weight combinations for reference points of 0.5 and 0.75 as loss aversion increases. This 
is intuitive as an RDD attack getting into the country and failing poses a loss that is amplified by 
increasing loss aversion, causing the attacker to reduce RDD attacks regardless of screening. The 
deterrence region decreases with increasing loss aversion for the reference points of 0.5 and 0.75, 
because the loss on recruitment from an RDD attack failing once in the country is increasingly 
amplified. Thus, the attacker prefers a CW attack regardless of screening. Lastly, the deterrence 
region decreases as the value for the reference point increases, while keeping loss aversion 
constant.  
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Evaluation of Recruitment  
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   Figure 2.8: The Effect of Varying Loss Aversion and Reference Point Values on 
Recruitment 
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The attacker suffers an increasing loss from an RDD attack getting into the country but failing as 
the reference point increases, making the CW attack regardless of screening a more attractive 
alternative.  
The effects of the varying reference point and loss aversion values on fear are shown in 
Figure 2.9. We consider 0, 0.2, and 0.5 for the varying reference points. Fear is an all gains 
framework when the reference point is 0, since there are not any outcomes generating a fear value 
less than 0. Thus, the attacker’s decision, influenced by an all gains fear frame, is the same across 
varying loss aversion values. Similarly, the attacker’s decision across the full space of attribute 
weight combinations when 𝜆 = 1 (irrespective of the reference point) is the same as what we 
observe when the reference point = 0 (irrespective of 𝜆).	Thus, the attacker’s decision in the 
absence of loss aversion placed on fear mirrors the actions of when there is an all gains fear 
framework. The loss generated by fear in the absence of loss aversion is too small to have an 
impact on the overall decision.  
When the reference points for fear are 0.2 and 0.5, the attacker’s decision changes as the 
loss aversion increases. An attacker whose primary objective is to instill fear uses an RDD attack 
regardless of screening for more attribute weight combinations when the reference point is 0.2 and 
loss aversion is increasing. This result is intuitive, since an RDD being intercepted during 
screening is not considered a loss with a 0.2 reference point. Conversely, a reference point of 0.5 
renders RDD caught during screening a loss. Thus, the attacker entirely abandons an RDD attack 
regardless of screening for all loss aversion values when the reference point is 0.5.  
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Evaluation of Fear  
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Figure  2.9: The Effect of Varying Loss Aversion and Reference Point Values on Fear  
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The deterrence region, when the fear reference point is 0.2, shifts to encompass more 
attribute weight combination as loss aversion increases. The change of the size in deterrence 
regions when the reference point is 0.2 with varying loss aversion values is negligible since RDD 
attack regardless of screening region also increases. The attacker is equally deterred across loss 
aversion values when failing the attack is the only loss being considered. An RDD that is caught 
during screening or failing once in the country is considered a loss when the reference point is 0.5, 
and the increase in loss aversion amplifies the loss suffered by the attacker. Therefore, the 
deterrence region, when the fear reference point is 0.5, decreases in size as the loss aversion 
increases. Thus, attacker chooses a CW attack regardless of screening for more attribute weight 
combinations. 
2.6   Discussion 
 
Given our results and parameter choices, an attacker will only choose an RDD attack regardless of 
the defender’s screening decision if almost all of their weight is on the fear attribute. In fact, a 
rational attacker will only choose this option if all the weight is on fear. The prospect theoretic 
attacker can have a small weight on cost or recruitment if: 
• The probability of attack success once the RDD is in the country (q) is high 
• The probability of the RDD being detected during screening (p) is low 
• The attacker is quite likelihood insensitive (k is low) 
• The attacker is more loss averse (𝜆 is high) 
However, it is unlikely that an attacker would choose an RDD regardless of screening unless they 
make multi-attribute decisions in a non-compensatory manner and fear is their most important 
(Tversky 1972) or most valid (Gigerenzer et al. 1999) attribute.  
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 An attacker will choose a conventional weapons attack regardless of the defender’s 
screening decision if most of their weight is on recruitment and/or cost, but not much weight is 
applied to fear. The prospect theoretic attacker can put more weight on fear (and hence less on 
recruitment and cost) if: 
• The probability of attack success once the RDD is in the country (q) is low 
• The attacker is more sensitive to likelihoods (k is high) 
• The attacker is more loss averse (𝜆 is high) 
The probability of the RDD being detected during screening (p) does not affect the boundaries of 
the region for this option. 
An attacker will be deterred by screening (choosing RDD if the defender doesn’t screen and 
conventional weapons if the defender does screen) if they put significant weight on fear, but also 
have some weight on cost and recruitment. Thus, this pattern of choices is more prevalent in 
attackers who are making trade-offs between all three attributes. The region covers more 
combinations of weights (gets larger) if: 
• The probability of attack success once the RDD is in the country (q) is high 
• The attacker is quite likelihood insensitive (k is low) 
• The attacker is less loss averse (𝜆 is low) 
The probability of the RDD being detected during screening (p) only affects the region as it 
increases the small area where the attacker chooses RDD regardless of screening if it is low. 
 These results show that the predictions of attacker behavior and the defender’s optimal 
decision depend on the importance of the three attributes to the attacker and their level of likelihood 
insensitivity overall and loss aversion on each attribute. Experiments have shown that decision 
makers from numerous different backgrounds exhibit loss aversion and likelihood insensitivity. It 
  37 
would seem unwise to assume that terrorists are the one group that would not exhibit such effects 
and hence make purely rational decisions. Thus, assuming a single-attribute expected utility model 
for the attacker can lead to biased predictions of their decisions and hence non-optimal 
prescriptions for the defender.  
 However, to apply such methods we need to parametrize these models and it is not clear 
what parameter values we should use. In our example, we have used a wide range of values 
observed across a range of experimental populations. We cannot (or maybe choose not to) carry 
out behavioral decision experiments with active terrorists. So, at this point, assuming values from 
other experiments is the best we can do, but this is not sufficient for a fully accurate model that 
could be implemented by a practitioner.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that this line of research 
should be ignored, and this work serves to demonstrate the need for more research in this area that 
will lead to important improvements in attacker/defender models. 
2.7   Conclusions and Future Research 
 
We have extended the work of Merrick and Leclerc (2016) on attacker modeling using single-
attribute prospect theory to the multiple attribute case. We implemented the additive form from 
Bleichrodt et al. (2009) as it can represent different reference points for each attribute. The three 
attributes considered were maximizing economic impact (cost), instilling fear in the target 
population, and maximizing recruitment (i.e. ensuring the longevity of the terrorist organization), 
with our choices guided by the larger attribute sets from Keeney (2007), Keeney and von 
Winterfeldt (2010), and Seibert et al. (2016). In our analysis, we considered each attribute one at 
a time, before analyzing the impact of the weights applied to each attribute, the primary 
probabilities in the attacker decision trees, the level of likelihood insensitivity, the levels of loss 
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aversion for each attribute, and the reference points that define the outcomes that are considered a 
loss in each attribute. 
It is clear from our results that the impact of screening for nuclear material on the attacker’s 
choice of attack is dependent on their preferences. Merrick and Leclerc (2016) found that the 
attacker’s decision was sensitive to their level of loss aversion and likelihood insensitivity. We 
confirm this finding, but also add the additional dimension of the weight the attacker applies to 
each outcome attribute in their decision making. Our analysis has allowed a consideration of 
attackers who make explicit trade-offs, but we have also considered an attacker who makes non-
compensatory decisions by applying all the weight to a single objective. The outcomes for cost, 
recruitment, and fear when considered alone make for different choices for the attacker. Using our 
parameter values, an attacker who considers only fear will choose an RDD attacker regardless of 
screening, while an attacker who considers only recruitment will choose conventional weapons 
regardless of screening. An attacker who considers only cost will be deterred by screening, an 
outcome that aligns with the results from Merrick and McLay (2010) and Merrick and Leclerc 
(2016) in their cost-only analysis.  
The question remains whether terrorists make multi-attribute decisions in a compensatory 
or non-compensatory manner. If the former, then our methodology is appropriate. This would 
appear probable for a larger, more mature terrorist organization. However, when considering 
smaller terrorist groups or lone-wolf attacks then the findings of Einhorn (1970, 1971) and Tversky 
et al. (1988) suggest that non-compensatory models would be more appropriate. For this to be 
considered, the non-compensatory models (Simon 1955), Tversky 1972), Gigerenzer et al. 1999) 
must be extended to incorporate uncertainty and research questions remain about the interplay 
between likelihood insensitivity, loss aversion, and non-compensatory choices with multiple 
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attributes. Further, as the prescriptive recommendations of attacker/defender models clearly 
depend on the choices of preference parameters for these descriptive decision models, we must 
estimate their values for specific attackers or terrorist organizations rather than use published 
experimental findings from very different populations. 
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Chapter 3: Adversarial Risk Matrices with an Expected Utility Framework 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
A risk matrix is used to evaluate risk in many engineering applications. Risk matrices provide a 
decision maker with a risk ranking framework that evaluates the probability and consequence 
pairing of each risk scenario. The ease of use and ability to make quick decisions make risk 
matrices an attractive solution for industry use.  Cox (2008a) states several shortcomings with the 
risk matrix approach, while concluding its discontinuation unlikely due to its widespread adoption. 
Ruan et al. (2015) improves risk matrices by integrating the risk attitudes of decision makers using 
expected utility theory. However, traditionally risk matrices have not considered adversarial risk 
and when used in counter-terrorism applications simply include the probability of a successful 
terrorist attack. 
The Department of Homeland Security uses the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical 
Asset Protection (RAMCAP) framework when prioritizing the defense of US infrastructures 
against terrorist attacks (Cox 2008b). Risk = Threat X Vulnerability X Consequence formula is an 
important part of the RAMCAP framework. Cox (2008b) states potential limitations with the Risk 
= Threat X Vulnerability X Consequence formulation, as it is a single-level decision making 
process. Cox (2008b) concludes that an adversarial framework (a two-level decision making 
process) is necessary for counter-terrorism applications, where the defender predicts the attacker’s 
action and then chooses the best response.  
In this chapter, we bridge the work of Ruan et al. (2015) and Cox (2008b) to provide an 
adversarial risk matrix framework with an expected utility framework. The adversarial risk matrix 
approach starts with an attacker risk matrix, that considers the vulnerability of the target and its 
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potential consequences. The attacker’s risk ranking provides the threat level for the defender’s risk 
matrix, which also includes the consequences of the attack. Thus, adversarial risk matrices are 
implemented by evaluating the Risk = Threat X Vulnerability X Consequence from an 
attacker/defender perspective.  
3.2   Risk Matrices 
 
A risk matrix is a two-dimensional table, with one axis representing the likelihood of an outcome, 
while the other representing its severity.  Each probability and consequence combination that is 
represented by the risk matrix corresponds to a discretized risk level that represent the priority 
level of an outcome (Cox 2008a). Thus, the decision maker can prioritize risk posing events by 
assigning a discrete risk level to the probability and consequence pairs. 
Ruan et al. (2015) consider the importance of incorporating risk attitudes of the decision 
makers by using their utility functions in determining the boundaries for regions representing the 
various risk ratings. Ruan et al. 2015 consider the utility function of the decision makers and 
introduce expected utility theory, EUT, to generate utility indifference curves to link the utility 
functions to the risk matrix. EUT is an integral part of decision making under uncertainty. EUT 
provides a prescriptive model for rational decision making. The utility function is used to quantify 
the risk attitudes. In this paper, we consider an attacker and a defender with varying risk attitudes.  
Ruan et al. (2015) provides the following framework for the utility function.  The 
consequence 𝑙 is the independent variable and the utility value 𝑢(𝑙) is the dependent variable, 
where both 𝑙 and 𝑢(𝑙) are negative. A transformation results in the scaling of the utility value, 
resulting in the range of 𝑢(𝑙) being −1,0 .	Ruan et al. (2015) next incorporate EUT and utility 
indifference curves to connect the utility functions to the risk matrix. The risk ratings of the 
decision makers are represented by the expected utility value of risk scenarios which correspond 
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to probabilities and consequences on the risk matrix. The points appearing on the same utility 
indifference curves have the same expected utility, as they represent an equal amount of risk to the 
decision makers.  
The discrete categories of risk ratings that are to be represented by the risk matrix are 
determined prior to establishing the utility indifference curves. A risk matrix with more risk ratings 
improves the successful categorization of multiple risk scenarios, since the ability to discriminate 
among outcomes are improved by providing additional constraints. The labeling of risk ratings as 
discrete categories, and the initial reference points for the risk ratings on the probability-
consequence coordinate system are necessary in categorizing areas that represent the varying risk 
ratings.  
We denote the initial reference point for the probability value that corresponds to a given 
risk level as 𝑝’ and the consequence value as 𝑙’. We further assume an an arbitrary point, with a 
probability value 𝑝 and a consequence value 𝑙, which coincides on the same utility indifference 
curve as the initial reference point. Since the initial reference point and the arbitrary point have the 
same expected utility value, the equality of the two utilities can be expressed as: 
                               𝑝𝑢(𝑙) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢(0) = 𝑝’𝑢(𝑙’) + (1 − 𝑝’)𝑢(0)                                      (2) 
where 𝑢(0) = 0; hence, 
                                                         𝑝𝑢(𝑙) = 𝑝’𝑢(𝑙’)	                              (3) 
or 
                         𝑝 = i(j’)i(j) 	𝑝′                                             (4) 
The initial reference point probability value, 𝑝l, is required to be 1, so that the decision 
maker only needs to determine the initial reference loss value, 𝑙’, in generating the utility 
indifference curves. A risk matrix that has 𝑁 risk ratings, requires 𝑁 − 1 utility indifference 
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curves. The 𝑁 areas created by the 𝑁 − 1 indifference utility curves are then assigned to each risk 
level to establish the risk matrix.  
3.3   Adversarial Risk Matrices 
 
We provide an elementary example of the attacker/defender, adversarial, 3 by 3 risk matrices. The 
implementation of the decision makers’ utility function is not considered in this section, as it will 
be presented in Section 3.4.  
 The Department of Homeland Security introduced a standard risk assessment formula in 
2007 to determine the security risks encountered at chemical plants in the United States. The 
formula they used was              
    																																									𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡	𝑥	𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑥	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒                            (5) 
where risk is the potential for loss from an attack, threat is the probability that the attacker chooses 
to attack, vulnerability is the probability that the attacker is successful with the chosen attack, and 
consequence is quantifiable loss generated by the attack. Cox (2008b) considers the limitations of 
this formulation and discusses intelligent decision making, where the defender considers the 
attacker’s decision prior to implementing a countermeasure, as a possible improvement. Thus, we 
consider equation (5) from the perspective of the attacker and defender in formulating an 
adversarial risk matrix with intelligent decision making. 
 We first consider the attacker’s decision making process. The attacker wishes to maximize 
the damage suffered by the defender and focuses on the vulnerability of the defender and the 
consequence of the attack. We assume that vulnerability and consequence have three levels: low, 
medium, and high. We further assume that the attacker has three risk ratings, and that the attacker 
is considering five different attacks, of which one will be executed. The risk ratings are color 
designated, and they are light grey, medium grey, and dark grey, most preferred to least preferred, 
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respectively. The various attacks are denoted a1, a2, a3, a4, and a5. The attacker risk matrix is 
provided in Figure 3.1.  
 
High a1 a3 a4 
Medium    
Low a2  a5 
Vulnerability/Consequence High Medium Low 
 
Figure 3.1: The attacker risk matrix 
 
The defender considers the attacker’s risk matrix before implementing safeguards against 
potential attacks. The defender focuses on the probability that the attacker attacks (i.e. the threat) 
and the consequence of the attack. We assume that the defender, like the attacker, has three levels 
for threat and consequence: low, medium, and high. The defender risk matrix in response to the 
attacker risk matrix is provided in Figure 3.2. Like the attacker, the defenders’ risk ratings are color 
designated, and they are light grey, medium grey, and dark grey, most preferred to least preferred, 
respectively. 
 
High a1 a3  
Medium a2  a4 
Low   a5 
Threat/Consequence High Medium Low 
 
Figure 3.2: The defender risk matrix 
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 The attacker and defender risk matrices demonstrate the link between the vulnerability and 
the threat. For instance, the attacker prefers the attacks a1 and a3, color coded light grey, to all of 
the remaining attacks. Thus, it is reasonably assumed that the attacker would choose to carry out 
a1 and a3 with a higher probability than the remaining attacks, making the threat of such attacks a 
high risk-level in the defender risk matrix. Furthermore, the attacker prefers the attacks a2 and a4, 
color coded medium grey, to a5, color coded dark grey. The defender; therefore, assumes that the 
attacker would carry out a2 and a4 with a probability lower than a1 and a3 but higher than a5, thus 
assigning a2 and a4 a medium threat level. Finally, the attacker least prefers a5, making it a low 
threat level to the defender.  
The attacker’s preference levels for the various attacks, the color-coded risk ratings in the 
attacker risk matrix, enables the defender to assign a threat level to each attack. The consequence 
is constant in both risk matrices. The defender’s risk level assignment to the threat, consequence 
pairs places the various attacks in bins based on the defender’s preferences, but the defender’s risk 
rating assignments does not have an impact on the vulnerability/threat link between the adversarial 
risk matrices.  
3.4   An EU Framework for Adversarial Risk Matrices 
 
The discrete number of risk ratings, the boundary values for the consequence/probability pairs, 
and the consequence reference values to be used in equation (4) are determined by the decision 
maker in the risk matrix establishment process. The consequence values in the adversarial risk 
matrices are scaled to range from 0 to -5. An attacker and a defender with eight risk ratings are 
considered. The boundary values for risk loss ratings for the attacker and the defender are assumed 
to be (-0.25, -0.75, -1.25, -1.75, -2.25, -2.75, and -3.25). The consequence reference values to be 
used in the utility indifference curves are assumed to be the same as consequence boundary values. 
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The attacker and the defender are both assumed to be risk averse, and we parametrize their level 
of risk aversion, 𝑟x and 𝑟y respectively. The utility functions of the attacker and the defender for 
risk loss 𝑙 are 𝑢x 𝑙 = 1 − 𝑒 z{| and 𝑢y 𝑙 = 𝑒 z{} − 1	, respectively. The utility indifference curves 
for the attacker,	pa, and the defender,	pd, are represented by using Equation 4: 
		𝑝x = "F~z/{|"F~ z{| 	𝑝′                                                                (6) 𝑝y = ~z/{}F"~z/}" 	𝑝′                                                                (7) 
The utility indifference curves link the risk matrices and the utility functions. Each consequence 
and probability of success pair corresponds to a discretized risk rating of the attacker. The 
defender, consequently, models the defender risk matrix by assigning a threat level to the attacker’s 
probability of success and consequence pairs. The defender achieves the assignment of threat 
levels by using the Luce model (Luce 1977) and considering all possible attacks by the attacker. 
The Luce model for choice, states that the probability of selecting an option,	i, out of a pool of 
options is  
                                                              	𝑃(𝑖) = JJJ                                                              (8) 
where 𝑤& is the weight assigned to the 𝑖-th item in the pool. We apply the Luce model to the 
expected utilities of the attacker to calculate the probability of an attacker choosing an attack from 
a pool of attacks – thus assigning a threat level and subsequently a risk rating to each attack on the 
defender matrix. The Luce model implies that an attacker will choose the	𝑖-th attack from a pool 
of attack options with probability: 
                                                                	𝑃(𝑖) = |(&)|(&)J                                 (9) 
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 We assume that the attacker will execute at least one of the attacks in consideration, and 
the attack that is most likely to be executed than any other attack warrants the highest threat level 
attainable with the other attacks scaled accordingly. Thus, the highest threat level (calculated 
using the Luce model) from the pool of attacks that the attacker is considering assigned a value 
of 1.0, and the remaining attacks are scaled accordingly to maintain proportionality. 
3.5 Application 
 
We consider an attacker, a terrorist organization, who has five different attack options, and a 
defender, a risk analyst working for the US government, with the objective of minimizing the 
damage inflicted by the attacker. The assumptions specified in Section 3.4 regarding the utility 
function of the attacker/defender and the settings of the risk matrix hold true. The damage of the 
attacks is evaluated on a monetary basis (in dollars). Short term damage inflicted on infrastructure 
and human life are the criterions considered in the valuation of the attacks. Long term impacts 
such as lost wages, reduction in commerce and tourism, psychological impacts on the masses are 
not considered to simplify the damage assessment process. To further simplify the damage 
assessment of the attacks, we assume that the attacks will result in only casualties, and not wounded 
survivors. We assign human life an economic value of $5.8 million, as suggested by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (2005). The list of attacks considered by the attacker, the economic 
damage and the probability of success (vulnerability) for each attack is provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Specifics of Each Attack Considered by the Attacker 
 
ID Attack  Casualties 
(# of People) 
Economic Damage 
(in Millions of $) 
Vulnerability 
(%) 
Consequence 
(Scaled Economic Damage) 
1 Single person attack 50 300 95 -0.51 
2 Terror cell attack 
(3-5 people) 
225 1468 83 -2.50 
3 Multi-terror cell attack 
(8-10 people) 
430 2800 70 -4.77 
4 Anthrax attack 
 
400 2320 55 -3.95 
5 Explosives on a plane 
(Boeing 777) 
451 2936 2 -5.00 
 
Economic damage in Table 3.1 does not consider the cost accrued by the attacker in 
generating the attack. The attacker the resources utilized in the attacks are sunk costs prior to the 
gains/loss evaluation process, thus they are not regarded as retroactive losses following an 
unsuccessful attack. An unsuccessful attack yields a gain of 0 for the attacker. 
The probability that each attack is carried out successfully, i.e. the vulnerability, decreases 
as the number of people carrying out the attack increases and/or the type of attack becomes more 
complex. This is intuitive, since the probability of the communications between individual 
attackers being intercepted increases with more parties having to share information in planning the 
attack. Similarly, the complexity of the attack impacts the likelihood that the attack is carried out 
successfully. We assume that the single person attack, terror-cell attack, and multi-terror cell 
attacks share the same level of complexity, as we assume they will be carried out with assault rifles 
and homemade bombs. These three attacks do not have the same vulnerability level; however, 
since the attacks consist of varying number of people performing the attacks. We assume that the 
anthrax attack and placing explosives on a plane are highly complex attacks, as these attacks 
require higher level of preparation – thus impacting the probability of success for each attack.  
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3.5a   The Attacker Risk Matrix 
 
Given the consequence and vulnerability values of each attack in Table 3.1, and the risk matrix 
construction information along with the attacker/defender utility function in Section 3.4, we 
generate Figure 3.3, The Attacker Risk Matrix for Varying Risk Aversion Values of 𝑟x =1, 2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	3. The risk ratings are labeled I through VIII, with VIII being the most preferable 
outcome for the attacker. The attacks are designated various shapes using the attack ids provided 
in Table 3.1. 
 
 
ra=1 ra=2 ra=3 
   
 
Figure 3.3: The Attacker Risk Matrix for Varying Risk Aversion Values 
 
An 𝑟x of 1 for risk averseness implies risk neutrality, while values of 2 and 3 imply 
increasing risk averseness. The utility indifference curves for the risk neutral attacker are flatter 
than those of the risk averse attacker, since the risk averse attacker becomes increasingly sensitive 
over vulnerability, consequence pairings as the absolute magnitude of consequences increases. For 
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example, the utility indifference curve that separates risk ratings II and III, is indifferent for the 
risk neutral attacker over high magnitude consequences, as the risk neutral attacker is indifferent 
between attacks with vulnerability, consequence pairings of 0.53, -5, and 0.56 and -3. As the 
attacker becomes more risk averse, the attacker exhibits increasing sensitivity to the vulnerability, 
consequence pairings. For the same utility indifference curve that separates risk ratings II and III, 
an attacker exhibiting risk aversion (𝑟x = 3), is indifferent between attacks with vulnerability, 
consequence pairings of 0.27, -5 and 0.35, -3 respectively. 
Three of the five attacks: the terror cell attack, the multi-terror cell attack, and the anthrax 
attack correspond to varying risk ratings as the risk aversion parameter, 𝑟x, changes. The highly 
probable outcome paired with a low consequence, the single person attack, and the highly 
improbable outcome paired with a high consequence, the explosives on a plane attack, are not 
impacted by the shifting in the utility indifference curves as the risk aversion varies. A risk neutral 
attacker prefers a terror cell attack over all attacks, while preferring multi-cell terror attack and an 
anthrax attack equally. As risk averseness increases, the attacker exhibits a more pronounced trade-
off between probability, consequence pairings with consequence values being assigned more 
weight than the probability counterpart. For example, an attacker (𝑟x = 3), prefers a multi-cell 
terror attack over a cell terror attack – a switch of preference when compared to a risk neutral 
attacker. Thus, a risk averse attacker would rather choose an attack with a slightly lower probability 
of success (i.e. vulnerability) and a much higher consequence. The probability of attacks being 
successful is considered much more thoroughly with the respective consequence level when risk 
averseness increases. 
3.5b   The Defender Risk Matrix 
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The expected utility of each attack is used in the Luce model to calculate the probability that the 
attacker carries out each individual attack given the array of available attacks. The calculated 
probability is referred to as threat in the defender risk matrix. The consequence of each attack 
remains the same. The expected utility values for the attacker risk aversion values of 1, 2, and 3 
and the corresponding scaled threat values are presented in Table 3.2. 
Using the consequence and threat values of each attack in Table 3.2 for the risk neutral 
attacker (𝑟y = 1), and the risk matrix construction information along with the attacker/defender 
utility function in Section 3.4, we generate Figure 3.4, The Defenders Risk Matrix for Varying 
Risk Aversion Values of 𝑟y = 1, 2, 3. The risk ratings are labeled I through VIII, with I being the 
most preferable outcome for the defender. The attacks are designated various shapes using the 
attack ids provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.2: Specifics of Each Attack from the Defender Perspective 
 
ID Attack  Vulnerability 
(%) 
Consequence 
(Scaled 
Economic 
Damage) 
EU for 
the 
Attacker 
(𝑟𝑎=1) 
EU for 
the 
Attacker 
(𝑟𝑎=2) 
EU for 
the 
Attacker 
(𝑟𝑎=3) 
Scaled 
Threat 
(𝑟𝑎=1) 
Scaled 
Threat  
(𝑟𝑎=2) 
Scaled 
Threat 
(𝑟𝑎=3) 
1 Single 
person 
attack 
95 -0.51 0.38 0.21 0.15 0.50 0.34 0.27 
2 Terror cell 
attack 
(3-5 people) 
83 -2.50 0.76 0.59 0.47 1.00 0.93 0.84 
3 Multi-terror 
cell attack 
(8-10 
people) 
70 -4.77 0.69 0.64 0.56 0.91 1.00 1.00 
4 Anthrax 
attack 
55 -3.95 0.54 0.47 0.40 0.71 0.75 0.72 
5 Explosives 
on a plane 
(Boeing 
777) 
2 -5.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
    
 
 Like the attacker risk matrix, the defender risk matrix which considers a risk neutral 
attacker (𝑟y = 1 in Figure 3.4) exhibits increasing sensitivity to the threat levels paired with the 
consequence levels, as the absolute magnitude of consequence increases. For example, a risk 
neutral defender (𝑟y = 1) is indifferent between a terror cell attack (a threat of 1.0 and a 
consequence of 2.5) and multi-terror cell attack (a threat of 0.91 and a consequence of -4.77). A 
risk averse defender (𝑟y = 3); however, prioritizes the multi-terror cell attack over all attacks. The 
highly improbable but highly consequential event of explosives on a plane, and the highly probable 
but highly inconsequential event of a single person attack are assigned a risk rating of I across all 
risk aversion values for the defender.  
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The defender’s prioritization of events using the risk rating system is highly impacted as 
the risk aversion increases and the events being considered are similar in threat but different in 
consequence. A risk neutral defender shows indifference to attacks sharing high treat level paired 
with significantly different consequence levels (i.e. -2.5 and -4.77). As the defender becomes more 
risk averse, the defender further differentiates risks associated with attacks sharing similar threat 
levels. Attacks with high threat and high consequence levels are most impacted by increasing risk 
aversion, with the assigned risk rating increasing as the risk aversion parameter, 𝑟y, increases. 
 
rd=1 rd=2 rd=3 
   
 
Figure 3.4: The Defender Risk Matrix for Varying Risk Aversion Values (ra=1) 
  
3.5c   The Defender Risk Matrix for varying Attacker/Defender Risk Aversion Values  
 
The defender risk matrix for varying attacker/defender risk aversion values are provided in Figure 
3.5. The consequence and threat level of each attack, characterized by the risk aversion of the 
attacker in Table 3.2, are used to plot each threat, consequence pair. The risk aversion of the 
defender is then considered in generating the utility indifference curves. Since the utility 
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indifference curves are generated solely by the defender’s risk aversion, the utility indifference 
curves are the same when the defender risk aversion is the same. Hence, all the plots in Figure 3.5 
that fall in the same column share the same utility indifference curves. Similarly, all the plots in 
Figure 3.5 that fall in the same row share the same threat level, since the threat levels are solely 
dependent on the attacker’s risk aversion. The consequence values of the attacks remain constant 
across all defender risk matrices. 
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Figure 3.5: The Defender Risk Matrix for Varying Risk Aversion Values 
  
   
The threat level for a given attack is calculated by dividing the attacker’s EU for that attack 
by the sum of the attacker’s EUs for all available attacks, then scaling the result so that the attack 
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with the highest threat from all available attacks is assigned a value of 1.0. Since the vulnerability 
of the attacks remain constant, the attacker’s risk aversion is the parameter that impacts both the 
numerator, attacker’s EU for a given attack, and the denominator, the sum of attacker’s EU for all 
available attacks. Since the threat value requires considering a given attack on both a proportional 
and a scaling basis to the other attacks, a rule of thumb for how the threat will vary for a given risk 
aversion of the attacker is not feasible.  Contrarily, the impact of the defender’s risk aversion values 
on a given risk aversion value for the attacker are predictable. As the risk aversion of the defender 
increases, the defender’s utility curves become increasingly sensitive over high threat, high 
consequence attacks. The defender’s sensitivity in considering trade-offs between attacks sharing 
similar threat levels with varying consequence levels increases as the defender’s risk aversion 
parameter, 𝑟y, increases. Thus, for a given 𝑟x where the threat levels care constant, increases in 𝑟y 
results in risk rating assignments that are equally or more severe than those with lower 𝑟y. 
Figure 3.6, The Defender’s Risk Ratings for Varying Attacker/Defender Risk Aversion 
Values, provides a condensed version of Figure 3.5 – eliminating the utility indifference curves to 
display the defender’s risk rating of each attack for all 𝑟x, 𝑟y combinations. In the case of the 
defender, excess risk aversion can be detrimental since an unnecessarily high risk rating could 
mean a costly misappropriation of resources. In Figure 3.6, we observe that all attacks for varying 
risk aversion and likelihood insensitivity values for the attacker correspond to a risk rating equal 
to or higher than those assigned to a less risk averse defender as the defender becomes more risk 
averse. Thus, for any give value of 𝑟x and 𝑘, if 𝑟y > 𝑟yl   then the defender’s 𝐸𝑈y > 𝐸𝑈yl , thus the 
risk rating is also higher.  
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Figure 3.6: The Defender’s Risk Ratings for Varying Attacker/Defender Risk Aversion 
Values 
 
We observe that a single person attack and explosives on a plane attack yield a risk rating 
of I for every 𝑟x, 𝑟y combination. The threat level of the explosives on a plane attack (3%) and the 
consequence level of a single wolf attack (-0.51) are extremely inconsequential that the shifts in 
the utility indifference curves caused by the changes in 𝑟y and the shifts in the threat levels caused 
by the changes in 𝑟x do not result in a more severe risk rating. Thus, the defender should only allot 
resources that are consistent with a risk rating of I in regards to the single person and explosives 
on a plane attacks. 
The risk aversion of the defender has a significant impact on attacks with high consequence 
and high threat levels, since the utility indifference curves on the defender risk matrix (Figure 3.5) 
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becomes increasingly refined as 𝑟y increases. In addition to 𝑟y, 𝑟x impacts risk rating assignments, 
as the threat level for each attack is a function of the attacker’s EU as calculated in the Luce model 
– which is directly impacted by the attacker’s risk aversion. For example, a multi-terror cell attack 
and a terror cell attack share a risk rating of VI when both the attacker and the defender are risk 
neutral. As the risk aversion increases for either the attacker, the defender or both, the multi-cell 
terror attack gets assigned a constant risk rating of VIII. If the defender understands that being risk 
averse (𝑟y > 1) is detrimental, the defender must determine whether the attacker is risk averse, as 
the attacker’s risk aversion will mandate the resources allotted in defending the multi-terror cell 
attack. 
Having established the benefits of the defender’s risk neutrality (𝑟y = 1), we observe that 
misappropriation of resources can also result from incorrectly evaluating the attacker’s risk 
aversion, ra. For example, the risk ratings are at the lowest value for all attacks except for the terror 
cell attack when 𝑟y = 1 and 𝑟x = 1. Similarly, the risk ratings are at the lowest value for all attacks 
except for the multi-terror cell attack when 𝑟y = 1 and 𝑟x = 3. Hence, if a defender believes that 
the attacker is risk neutral when the attacker is in fact severely risk averse (𝑟x = 3), the multi-cell 
terror attack would be inadequately defended while the single-cell terror attack would be 
excessively defended. Thus, the defender’s understanding of the attacker is instrumental in 
ensuring the appropriate assignment of resources for a given attack. Using Figure 3.6, a defender 
at the very least would know not to assign a risk rating more than 1, 6, 8, 4, and 1 for the single 
person attack, terror cell attack, multi-terror cell attack, anthrax attack and explosives on a plane 
attack, respectively – as these values are the most extreme risk rating assignments when the risk 
aversion of the attacker is unknown and the defender is risk neutral.  
3.6   Conclusions 
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We have introduced adversarial risk matrices to provide a two-level decision making process 
where a defender evaluates decisions available to an attacker then translates the attacker’s actions 
into a discretized risk rating system using a defender risk matrix. The Risk=Threat X Vulnerability 
X Consequence formula, which is widely used by the Department of Homeland Security in 
assessing risk, was broken down to vulnerability/consequence and threat/consequence pairings to 
generate the attacker risk matrix and the defender risk matrix, respectively. The Luce model was 
used to link the attacker and defender risk matrices.  
The adversarial risk matrices accounts for the risk aversion exhibited by the attacker and 
the defender, since the risk aversion parameter was used in the attacker/defender utility functions.  
The risk aversion of the defender impacts the shape of the utility indifference curves while the risk 
aversion of the attacker impacts the threat level for each attack on the defender risk matrix. As the 
defender becomes more risk averse for a given risk aversion of the attacker, the attacks receive a 
risk rating equal to or higher than that of a less risk averse defender. The defender provides more 
than or equal to what is necessary to defend against an attack as the risk aversion of the defender 
increases. Therefore, maintaining risk neutrality is the optimal solution for a defender guarding 
against an attacker.  
 In addition to the risk aversion of the defender, the defender’s perception of the attacker, 
namely the risk aversion of the attacker, is instrumental in appropriate resource allocation for a 
given attack. For example, if the defender believes the attacker is risk neutral when the attacker is 
in fact severely risk averse, the defender could allocate resources to excessively defend against 
some attacks while others are inadequately defended. The defender risk matrix can assist the 
defender in performing scenario analysis, thus uncovering hidden trade-offs among various 
defense strategies.
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Chapter 4: Adversarial Risk Matrices with a Prospect Theoretic Framework 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3, we introduced adversarial risk matrices to model sequential counter-terrorism 
decisions and provided an EUT framework to model the risk preferences of both the attacker and 
defender. Specifically, we assumed utility functions for the attacker and defender, 𝑢x 𝑙 = 1 −
𝑒 z{| and 𝑢y 𝑙 = 𝑒 z{} − 1	, respectively. The utility indifference curves for the attacker,	𝑝x, and the 
defender,	𝑝y, were represented by: 
    		𝑝x = "F~z/{|"F~ z{| 	𝑝′                                                                (1) 𝑝y = ~z/{}F"~z/}" 	𝑝′                                                               (2) 
 
The utility indifference curves link the risk matrices and the utility functions. We used the Luce 
model to find the probability or frequency that the attacker would choose a given attack given the 
attacker’s expected utility for each attack: 
                                                            	𝑃(𝑖) = |(&)|(&)J                                 (3) 
We then scaled the probabilities of each attack so that the attack with the highest likelihood being 
executed corresponds to the highest threat possible, 1.0, with the other attacks being scaled 
accordingly to maintain proportionality among attacks. 
In Chapter 3, we concluded that an accurate description of the attacker has a direct impact 
on the appropriate allocation of resources, thus it is ideal to provide the defender the best 
descriptive model of the attacker.  As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, expected utility theory 
(EUT) fails to adequately work as a descriptive model and, therefore, EUT could be questioned in 
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applicability for modeling the attacker’s preferences. Three common areas where EUT falls short 
in describing human decision making include: reference dependence, probabilistic insensitivity, 
and rank dependence. The prospect theoretic approach by Kahneman and Tversky provides a 
framework that can address systematic deviation of human behavior from EUT (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). Thus, a more appropriate approach to adversarial risk matrices would be to model 
the attacker decisions using prospect theory, and prescribe a prioritization of attacks to the defender 
using EUT.  
 The issue of reference dependence does not need to be considered in regards to the attacker 
in our prospect theoretic approach. The defender deems the resources utilized in the attacks as 
sunk costs; therefore, the resources spent towards generating the attacks are not regarded as 
retroactive losses following an unsuccessful attack. Thus, a gain/loss framework is not necessary. 
 As for issues surrounding probabilistic insensitivity, the prospect theoretic approach in 
describing the attacker is justified. Likelihood insensitivity is when a decision maker overweighs 
probabilities that are small, underweights probabilities that are large, while remaining insensitive 
to probabilities that are near the middle (50%). Empirical research suggests that likelihood 
insensitivity is common and that prospect theoretic modeling is appropriate to use in descriptive 
modeling (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
4.2   Methodology 
 
Similar to our approach in Chapter 2, we implement the neo-additive probability weighting 
function used by Chateauneuf et al. (2007),  
𝜋 𝑝 = 	 		1						𝑝 = 1𝑘𝑝 + 12 1 − 𝑘 	0 < 𝑝 < 1			0						𝑝 = 0  
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where 0	 < 	𝑘	 < 	1. A 𝑘 = 1 indicates the absence of probability weighting. Baillon et al. (2014) 
suggests that a value of 𝑘 between 0.6 and 0.8 should be adopted when evaluating the impact of 
likelihood insensitivity for the neo-additive probability weighting function. Thus, we consider 
values of 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8 in modeling the attacker’s likelihood insensitivity.  
The reference dependence of the attacker is not considered within our prospect-theoretic 
descriptive framework, since we assume that the attacker evaluates each attack as a part of a gains 
framework regardless of whether the attack was successful. The attacker considers the resources 
used to generate each attack to be an investment, and an unsuccessful attack yields a gain of 0. The 
resources utilized in the attacks are “spent” prior to the gains/loss evaluation process, thus they are 
not regarded as retroactive losses following an unsuccessful attack.  
The prospect-theoretic approach in modeling the attacker does not have an impact on the 
utility indifference curves used in the defender risk matrix. However, there is an impact on the 
expected utility of each attack, since the utility of each attack is multiplied by the weighted 
probability when calculating expected utility. Since, the expected utility of each attack is used in 
the Luce model to calculate the proportional EU of the attacks, the prospect-theoretic attacker 
yields varying threat levels on the defender risk matrix. The varying combinations of 𝑘, risk 
aversion of the attacker (𝑟x), the risk aversion of the defender (rd), and the corresponding risk rating 
for each attack are explored in the Results section. 
4.3   Application 
 
We mirror the example used in Chapter 3 and extend our work by describing the attacker in a 
prospect-theoretic manner. We consider an attacker, a terrorist organization, who has five different 
attack options, and a defender, a risk analyst working for the US government, with the objective 
of minimizing the damage inflicted by the attacker. The assumptions specified in Chapter 3 
  63 
regarding the utility function of the attacker/defender and the settings of the risk matrix hold true. 
The damage of the attacks is evaluated on a monetary basis (in dollars). Short term damage 
inflicted on infrastructure and human life are the criterions considered in the valuation of the 
attacks. Long term impacts such as lost wages, reduction in commerce and tourism, psychological 
impacts on the masses are not considered to simplify the damage assessment process. To further 
simplify the damage assessment of the attacks, we assume that the attacks will result in only 
casualties, and not wounded survivors. We assign human life an economic value of $5.8 million, 
as suggested by the U.S. Department of Transportation (2005).  
The Risk = Threat X Vulnerability X Consequence formula, which is widely used by the 
Department of Homeland Security in assessing risk, provides the foundation of the attacker and 
the defender risk matrices with vulnerability/consequence and threat/consequence pairings, 
respectively. The Luce model translates the vulnerability/consequence pairings to a threat level on 
on the defender risk matrix. The utility of each attack for the attacker that is used in the Luce model 
is multiplied by the weighted probability of the respective attack, with the likelihood insensitivity 
depending on the neo-additive probability weighting function parameter, 𝑘. We consider the values 
of 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 1.0 for 𝑘. A 𝑘 of 1.0 describes an attacker without likelihood insensitivity. As 
the value of 𝑘 decreases, the likelihood insensitivity of the attacker increases. The list of attacks 
considered by the attacker, the probability of success for each attack (the vulnerability), the 
expected utility of each attack for a given risk aversion by the attacker, and the corresponding 
probability of the attacker carrying out each attack (the threat) are provided for the various values 
of the probability weighting parameter (𝑘) in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: The Specifics of Each Attack from the Defender Perspective 
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ID Probability 
Weighting 
(k) 
Attack  Vulnerability 
(%) 
Consequence 
(Scaled 
Economic 
Damage) 
EU for the 
Attacker 
(𝑟𝑎=1) 
EU for the 
Attacker 
(𝑟𝑎=2) 
EU for the 
Attacker 
(𝑟𝑎=3) 
Threat 
(𝑟𝑎=1) Threat  (𝑟𝑎=2) Threat (𝑟𝑎=3) 
1 0.6 Single person 
attack 
77.0 -0.51 0.31 0.17 0.12 0.48 0.30 0.24 
2 0.6 Terror cell 
attack 
(3-5 people) 
69.8 -2.50 0.64 0.50 0.39 1.00 0.89 0.80 
3 0.6 Multi-terror 
cell attack 
(8-10 people) 
62.0 -4.77 0.61 0.56 0.49 0.95 1.00 1.00 
4 0.6 Anthrax 
attack 
53.0 -3.95 0.52 0.46 0.39 0.81 0.82 0.80 
5 0.6 Explosives 
on a plane 
(Boeing 777) 
21.2 -5.00 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.33 0.34 0.35 
1 0.7 Single person 
attack 
81.5 -0.51 0.33 0.18 0.13 0.49 0.31 0.25 
2 0.7 Terror cell 
attack 
(3-5 people) 
73.1 -2.50 0.67 0.52 0.41 1.00 0.90 0.80 
3 0.7 Multi-terror 
cell attack 
(8-10 people) 
64.0 -4.77 0.63 0.58 0.51 0.94 1.00 1.00 
4 0.7 Anthrax 
attack 
53.5 -3.95 0.52 0.46 0.39 0.78 0.79 0.76 
5 0.7 Explosives 
on a plane 
(Boeing 777) 
16.4 -5.00 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.24 0.26 0.25 
1 0.8 Single person 
attack 
86.0 -0.51 0.34 0.19 0.13 0.49 0.32 0.25 
2 0.8 Terror cell 
attack 
(3-5 people) 
76.4 -2.50 0.70 0.55 0.43 1.00 0.92 0.81 
3 0.8 Multi-terror 
cell attack 
(8-10 people) 
66.0 -4.77 0.65 0.60 0.53 0.93 1.00 1.00 
4 0.8 Anthrax 
attack 
54.0 -3.95 0.53 0.47 0.40 0.76 0.78 0.75 
5 0.8 Explosives 
on a plane 
(Boeing 777) 
11.6 -5.00 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.17 
1 1.0 Single person 
attack 
95 -0.51 0.38 0.21 0.15 0.50 0.34 0.27 
2 1.0 Terror cell 
attack 
(3-5 people) 
83 -2.50 0.76 0.59 0.47 1.00 0.93 0.84 
3 1.0 Multi-terror 
cell attack 
(8-10 people) 
70 -4.77 0.69 0.64 0.56 0.91 1.00 1.00 
4 1.0 Anthrax 
attack 
55 -3.95 0.54 0.47 0.40 0.71 0.75 0.72 
5 1.0 Explosives 
on a plane 
(Boeing 777) 
2 -5.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
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4.4   Results 
 
The defender risk matrices for the various combination of 𝑟x (risk aversion of the attacker), 𝑟y (risk 
aversion of the defender), and 𝑘 (likelihood insensitivity parameter) of 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 1.0 are 
provided in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, respectively. The various values for 𝑘 which highlights 
the likelihood insensitivity exhibited by a prospect-theoretic attacker does not impact the 
defender’s utility indifference curves. The utility indifferences curves are function of 𝑟y, and the 
boundaries that define each risk rating which the defender uses to assign risk ratings are identical 
for a given 𝑟y, hence the utility indifference curves for the defender are identical to our results in 
Chapter 3. 
 While the defender risk matrices’ utility indifference curves are identical for the prospect-
theoretic and the EU attacker for any given 𝑟y, the varying values of 𝑘 provide insight on how a 
prospect-theoretic attacker fundamentally differs from a (EU) attacker in respect to probability of 
carrying out each attack, i.e. the threat. The threat level is a scaled measure of the proportion of an 
attack’s expected utility in comparison to the summation of the expected utility of all attacks being 
considered. The expected utility is a multiplicative calculation involving the utility of each attack 
and the probability of success for that respective attack (i.e. the vulnerability). Vulnerability 
measurements are directly impacted by the likelihood insensitivity of the attacker. Likelihood 
insensitivity causes an attacker to overweigh low probabilities and underweight high probabilities, 
thus significantly distorting the probability weighting of the explosives on a plane 
(vulnerability=2%) attack and the single person attack (vulnerability=95%). An attacker described 
by a lowest value of 𝑘 (i.e. 0.6) exhibits the highest level of likelihood insensitivity while an 
attacker described by the highest value of 𝑘 (i.e. 1.0) does not exhibit likelihood insensitivity.  
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 Table 4.1, The Specifics of Each Attack from the Defender Perspective, provides a 
numerical insight of likelihood insensitivity’s impact on the threat levels, while Figures 4.1, 4.2, 
4.3, and 4.4 provide a visual insight of defender’s prioritization of attacks using risk matrices. The 
attack that is most impacted by attacker’s likelihood insensitivity is the explosives on the plane 
attack, since this attack poses the highest level of consequence (-5) while being paired with the 
lowest level of vulnerability (2%) in the absence of likelihood insensitivity. As the likelihood 
insensitivity changes from the lack of likelihood insensitivity (𝑘 = 1.0) to 0.8, 0.7, and 0.6, the 
attacker’s impression of a successful explosives on a plane attack increases from 2% to 11.6%, 
16.4%, and 21.2%, respectively. The increase in vulnerability increases the EU of this attack, thus 
increasing the threat level associated with the explosives on the plane attack.  
 In Chapter 3, prior the implementing a prospect-theoretic attacker, the threat level of 
attacks changed with shifts in the risk aversion of the attacker, 𝑟x, and the utility indifferences 
curves changed with shifts in the risk aversion of the defender, 𝑟y. With the implementation of a 
prospect-theoretic attacker, we observe that changes in likelihood insensitivity significantly 
impacts the threat of attacks with high and low probabilities for vulnerability. In the case of the 
explosives on a plane attack, the threat level from an EU attacker (𝑘 = 1) is a constant measure of 
3%, yielding a defender’s risk rating of I for all 𝑟x, 𝑟y combinations in the defender risk matrix of 
Figure 4.4. The same attack paired with the most extreme likelihood insensitivity (𝑘 = 0.6) yields 
a risk rating of II, III, and III for a risk averse attacker (𝑟x = 3) across 𝑟y=1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
The attacker’s perception of increased success with respect to an attack with a high consequence 
increases the likelihood of the attacker carrying out the respective attack, thus increasing the threat 
level and subsequently the attack’s risk rating on the defender risk matrix.  
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 Contrarily, an attack with high probability of success, namely the single person attack, 
likelihood insensitivity does not have as pronounced impact as the low probability success attack, 
namely the explosives on a plane attack. The single person attack has a consequence of -0.51 and 
the highest level of vulnerability (95%) in the absence of likelihood insensitivity. As the likelihood 
insensitivity changes from the lack of likelihood insensitivity (𝑘 = 1.0) to 0.8, 0.7, and 0.6, the 
attacker’s impression of a successful single person attack decreases from 95% to 86%, 81.5%, and 
77%, respectively. Since the threat for a given attack is a measure of the proportional EU of that 
attack in respect to the summation of the EU of all attacks, the threat level of a single person attack 
is not greatly impacted across various likelihood insensitivity values for 𝑘. The utility of the single 
person attack in the absence of likelihood insensitivity is sufficiently low that the defender risk 
matrix prioritizes the attack with a risk rating of I across all 𝑟x , 𝑟y  combinations in Figure 4.4. As 
the attacker’s perception of the single person attack’s success decreases, the expected utility of 
that attack decreases, thus decreasing the threat of the attack in the presence of likelihood 
insensitivity. Since the single person attack is assigned a risk rating of I in the absence of likelihood 
for every combination of 𝑟x , 𝑟y  and likelihood insensitivity further reduces the threat level of the 
attack, the single person attack is assigned a risk rating of I across every combination of 𝑘, 𝑟x , and 𝑟y .  
 While Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 provide a visual depiction of the defender risk matrices 
for various likelihood insensitivity values, 𝑘 =0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 1.0, respectively, Figure 4.5 
provides a condensed visualization of varying levels of risk aversion for the attacker and defender, 
likelihood insensitivity values and the respective risk ratings. Figure 4.5 is designed to be a 
prescriptive tool to help the defender evaluate attackers with varying likelihood insensitivity and 
risk aversion values while understanding the impact of a given risk aversion for the defender. 
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Research shows that decision makers tend to be overly risk averse and that being less risk neutral 
over time would be beneficial to the decision maker.   
In the case of our defender, excess risk aversion can be detrimental since an unnecessarily 
high risk rating could mean a costly misappropriation of resources. In Figure 4.5, we observe that 
all attacks for varying risk aversion and likelihood insensitivity values for the attacker correspond 
to a risk rating equal to or higher than those assigned to a less risk averse defender as the defender 
becomes more risk averse. Like Chapter 3, for any given value of 𝑟x and 𝑘, if 𝑟y > 𝑟yl  then the 
defender’s 𝐸𝑈	 > 	𝐸𝑈’, thus the risk rating is also higher. A costly misappropriation of resources 
can result when a defender does not exhibit risk neutrality, consequently assigning a risk rating for 
an attack higher than what the attack requires. 
Given that we have justified the defender’s risk neutrality over risk averseness, we now 
evaluate prioritization schemes available to the defender when 𝑟y = 1 based on the defender’s 
characterization of the attacker in regards to likelihood insensitivity and risk aversion. Since the 
single person attack’s threat level results in a risk rating of I in the absence of likelihood 
insensitivity (𝑘 = 1) across all risk aversion values for the attacker, and the attack’s threat level is 
further reduced in the presence of likelihood insensitivity (𝑘 > 1), the single person attack is 
assigned a risk rating of I across all risk aversion and likelihood insensitivity values for the 
attacker.  Like our findings in Chapter 3, the defender is prescribed to appropriate resources aligned 
with a risk rating of I in respect to a single person attack, regardless of the defender’s perception 
of the attacker.   
Contrarily, the explosives on a plane attack receives a risk rating of I only if the attacker’s 
likelihood insensitivity (𝑘) is greater than or equal to 0.8. An attacker’s perception of the 
explosives on a plane attack’s success heavily depends on the attacker’s likelihood insensitivity, 
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as the risk aversion of the attacker does not play a role. A reduction in likelihood insensitivity 
causes the attacker to overweight the probability of a successful explosives on a plane attack, thus 
raising the threat level for the defender and subsequently raising the attack’s risk rating. The 
defender’s mischaracterization of the attacker’s likelihood insensitivity in regards to the explosives 
on plane attack can result in excessive defense if the defender believes that the attacker is more 
likelihood insensitive than reality (a risk rating assignment of II when I is required), or inadequate 
defense if the defender believes that the attacker is less likelihood insensitive than reality (a risk 
rating assignment of I when II is required). Thus, the attacker’s likelihood insensitivity plays a 
significant role in the appropriate resource allocation of the explosives on a plane attack’s defense. 
The multi-terror cell attack and the terror cell attack receive a risk rating of VI when the 
attacker exhibits risk neutrality (𝑟x = 1) while not displaying severe likelihood insensitivity (𝑘	 ≠	0.6). When the attacker exhibits risk neutrality (𝑟x = 1) and severe likelihood insensitivity (𝑘 =6), the multi-terror cell attack receives a risk rating of VII while the terror cell attack receives a 
risk rating of VI.  As the attacker becomes more risk averse (𝑟x > 1), the multi terror cell attack 
receives the most severe risk rating of VIII for all ra, k combinations. Contrarily, the terror cell 
attack receives a risk rating of IV for all 𝑟x, 𝑘 combinations as the attacker becomes more risk 
averse, except for an attacker with no/little likelihood insensitivity (𝑘 = 0.8 & 𝑘 = 1.0) when 𝑟x =2. Determining the risk aversion of the attacker is critical in the case of the multi-terror cell attack 
and the terror cell attack, since the existence of the attacker’s risk aversion would require the most 
severe risk rating for the multi-terror attack for all 𝑟x, 𝑘 combinations, while requiring a risk rating 
of either IV or V for the terror cell attack. The likelihood insensitivity impacts the risk rating 
assignment of the multi-terror cell attack if the attacker is risk neutral and severely likelihood 
insensitive. The terror cell attack’s risk rating assignment; on the other hand, is only impacted by 
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likelihood insensitivity if the attacker is moderately risk averse with no/little likelihood 
insensitivity. 
As previously mentioned, likelihood insensitivity causes the attacker to overweight low 
probabilities and underweight high probabilities. Likelihood insensitivity also causes the attacker 
to be insensitive to probabilities near 50%. Since the anthrax attack has a probability of success, 
vulnerability, value of 53% in the absence of likelihood insensitivity, the anthrax attack is the least 
impacted by the existence of likelihood insensitivity.  As the likelihood insensitivity changes from 
the lack of likelihood insensitivity (𝑘 = 1.0) to 0.8, 0.7, and 0.6, the attacker’s impression of a 
successful anthrax attack increases from 53% to 53.5%, 54%, and 55%, respectively. However, 
since the anthrax attack is accompanied by a large consequence value of -3.95 and the attack is in 
a region on the defender risk matrix that is heavily impacted by changes in rd, small changes in the 
threat level causes a change in the risk rating of the attack. Hence, a risk neutral attacker (𝑟x = 1) 
without likelihood insensitivity (𝑘 = 1) and a severely risk averse attacker (𝑟x = 3) without 
likelihood insensitivity (𝑘 = 1) requires a risk rating of III, while the same risk having attackers 
with likelihood insensitivity is assigned a risk rating of IV.  Thus, we conclude that small changes 
on the threat level caused by likelihood insensitivity can impact risk rating assignments if the attack 
is of high consequence and moderate threat. 
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Figure 4.1: The Defender Risk Matrix for Varying Risk Aversion Values when k=0.6 
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Figure 4.2: The Defender Risk Matrix for Varying Risk Aversion Values when k=0.7 
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Figure 4.3: The Defender Risk Matrix for Varying Risk Aversion Values when k=0.8 
 
 
 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
  74 
Attacker/ 
Defender Risk 
Aversion  
rd =1.0 rd =2.0 rd =3.0 
 
 
 
            
 
            ra =1.0 
   
 
 
 
 
             ra =2.0 
   
 
 
 
 
             ra =3.0 
   
 
Figure 4.4: The Defender Risk Matrix for Varying Risk Aversion Values when k=1.0 
 
 
 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Consequence
Th
re
at
I
III
V
VII
1
2
3
4
5
  75 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Risk Ratings for Varying Risk Aversion and Likelihood Insensitivity Values 
 
4.5   Conclusions 
 
 In Chapter 3, we introduced adversarial risk matrices that utilize an expected utility 
framework for the attacker and the defender, and concluded that the defender’s description of the 
attacker is essential in proper resource allocation. In Chapter 4, we improved the defender’s 
description of the attacker by utilizing a prospect-theoretic framework. Adversarial risk matrices 
that describe the attacker in the prospect-theoretic sense and prescribe actions to the defender using 
Expected Utility Theory enhance the defender’s risk categorization capabilities by providing the 
defender a more realistic description of the attacker, one that is more aligned with empirical 
research. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
Decision making in counterterrorism applications have traditionally considered a rational attacker 
with a single objective of maximizing financial damage and a defender with the objective of 
minimizing the damage inflicted by the attacker.  Empirical research suggests that decision makers 
deviate from rationality, thus it is more realistic to provide a descriptive model of the attacker 
using prospect theory, while prescribing actions to the defender using expected utility theory.  
Using this as a foundation of our research, in Chapter 2, we modeled the attacker’s behavior using 
multi-attribute prospect theory to account for an attacker with multiple objectives and deviations 
from rationality, while using expected utility theory to prescribe the appropriate actions to the 
defender. We modeled our approach by considering an attacker who wishes to smuggle radioactive 
material into the United States and a defender who has the option of implementing a screening 
process to hinder the attacker. In Chapter 3, we incorporated an Expected Utility framework to 
model adversarial risk matrices where risk matrices have not been historically considered as a two 
level decision making process. In Chapter 4, we enhanced our work in Chapter 3 by considering a 
prospect theoretic approach to describe the attacker, while using expected utility to prescribe 
actions to the defender. Our findings show that  the descriptive validity of the defender’s  
characterization  of the attacker  is critical in appropriate resource allocation in defense of the 
attacks, thus the defender should carefully  consider the impacts of the attacker’s deviations from 
rationality  when considering defense options.
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